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Abstract 
 
Understanding the performance of banks is of the utmost relevance, because of the 
impact of this sector on economic growth and financial stability. Of all the different assets 
that make up a bank portfolio, the residential mortgage loans constitute one of its main. 
Using the dynamic panel data method, we analyse the influence of residential mortgage 
loans on bank profitability and risk, using a sample of 555 banks in the European Union 
(EU-15), over the period from 1995 to 2008. 
We find that banks with larger weights of residential mortgage loans show lower 
credit risk in good times. This result explains why banks rush to lend on property during 
booms due to the positive effects it has on credit risk. The results show further that credit 
risk and profitability are lower during the upturn in the residential property price cycle. The 
results also reveal the existence of a non-linear relationship (U-shaped marginal effect), as a 
function of bank’s risk, between profitability and the residential mortgage loans exposure. 
For those banks that have high credit risk, a large exposure of residential mortgage loans is 
associated with higher risk-adjusted profitability, through lower risk. For banks with a 
moderate/low credit risk, the effects of higher residential mortgage loan exposure on its 
risk-adjusted profitability are also positive or marginally positive.  
 
Keywords: Residential Property Prices; Mortgage Loans; Bank Performance; 
Dynamic Panel Estimation 
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1. Introduction 
The recent turmoil in the world’s financial system, which began in the US mortgage credit 
markets, shows the very close relationship between property price changes and the 
financial sector health. Slumps in the property market tend to follow and exacerbate, or 
spur banking crises1, as demonstrated by Allen and Gale (2000) and proven by several 
historical crises2, the most recent example of which is the subprime crisis.  
There is almost universal agreement that the fundamental cause of the subprime 
crisis was the combination of credit boom and housing bubble. Pezzuto (2008) refers the 
low interest rates, high level of leverage, “credit euphoria” of both mortgage lenders and 
borrowers and a more aggressive short-term orientation as the combined factors which 
have probably strongly contributed to the subprime crisis. Acharya et al. (2011) refer that 
when the “bubble” burst, a severe economic crisis was bound to come. These events 
resulted in a collapse of the banking industry3, stock market crashes, a large decrease in 
liquidity on the credit market, economic recession and furthermore they have engulfed 
sovereign insolvency in almost all countries. Moreover, this crisis affected real economies 
as well as financial markets, resulting for example, in drops in productivity growth, 
increases in unemployment rate, and a decrease in international trade. Horta et al. (2008) 
and Hwang et al. (2010) examined the contagion effects of US subprime crisis on 
international stock markets. Hwang et al. (2010) found evidence of financial contagion 
during the US subprime crisis not only in emerging markets but also in developed markets 
(the case of European countries). Horta et al. (2008) using copula models found that 
markets in Canada, Japan, Italy, France and UK display significant levels of contagion.  For 
other two countries analyzed (Germany and Portugal) the null hypothesis of absence of 
contagion could not be rejected. Finally, Verick and Islam (2010) refer the Baltic States, 
Ireland and Spain as the European Countries that suffered a severe labour market impact 
and economic contraction as a result of the subprime crisis. Germany and Austria appear in 
the opposite situation. 
Of all the different assets that comprise banks’ portfolios, real estate assets are 
particularly important for two reasons. Firstly, mortgage loans represent one of its most 
                                                 
1 Herring and Wachter (1999) state that “Real Estate Cycles may occur without banking crises and banking crises may 
occur without real estate cycles. But the two phenomena are correlated in remarkable number of instances ranging over a wide 
variety of institutional arrangements, in both advanced industrial nations and emerging economies”. 
2 For example, in the US and Scandinavia (late 80s), Mexico and Japan (early 90s) and Southeast Asia (1998). 
Please refer to Hilbers et al., 2001. 
3
 The list of banks that have been affected by the 2007-2012 global financial crisis can be seen in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_bankrupt_or_acquired_banks_during_the_subprime_mortgage_crisis  
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important asset categories. Within the EU-15, for the period from 2001 to 2008, the weight 
of residential property loans in total loans varied from a maximum value of 33% in 2003 to 
a minimum of 21% in 2008 (ECB, 2005 and 2010). Secondly, the banks’ exposure to the 
real estate sector is even larger owing to the widespread use of these assets as collateral for 
other types of loans. 
Herring and Wachter (1999) state that during an upswing of real estate price 
movements, banks tend to underestimate the default risk of loans directly or indirectly 
related to real estate. The existence of moral hazard and disaster myopia, caused by high 
competition and size growth, following the liberalisation of the banking sector and by the 
loss of institutional memory regarding the possibility of property prices collapse, tends to 
induce banks to take excessive risks whereas the risk premium may be insufficient to cover 
potential losses4. Jimenez et al. (2006) state that during booms riskier borrowers obtain 
credit and collateral requirements decreases. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) also found evidence 
of a decrease in lending standards associated with substantial increases in the number of 
loan applications. The authors show that lending standards declined more in areas that 
experienced faster credit growth. They also found that the entry of new lenders contributed 
to the decline in lending standards.  
Gentle et al. (1994) studied the reasons for the high number of families with debts 
in the United Kingdom in the early 90s. The authors report a constantly expanding 
mortgage-financed policy that they called the “property owning democracy” which, after 
the collapse of property prices, led to a “nation of debtors”. This phenomenon of 
“negative equity”5 has also been observed by White (2010a, 2010b), who states that in the 
US, the collapse of property prices resulted in an increasing number of defaults, since the 
property market prices fell below the original mortgage advance used to buy the property6.  
Despite extensive literature on the relationship between bank loans and real estate 
prices at a macroeconomic level, few studies have been undertaken on the impact of real 
estate prices on bank profitability and credit risk. Davis and Zhu (2009) argue specifically 
that most studies fail to highlight the role that real estate may play in the performance of 
                                                 
4 The Economist, 2003, reveals that the “six countries where houses appear to be overvalued (America, Britain, 
Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain) also share another bubble-like symptom: an explosion in mortgage borrowing in 
recent years. ... In the Netherlands the average new mortgage there is 110% of the value of a home, because lenders are happy to 
finance all the purchasing costs, including stamp duty and fees. ... This means that if prices were to drop, more households would 
be left with debts exceeding the value of their home than were a decade ago.” 
5 This refers to the situation whereby the market value of the property on the mortgage completion date is 
lower than the value of the capital owing to the bank. 
6 The author calls this decision “strategic default”. 
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the banking sector. Furthermore results may be biased given that most studies examine 
separately the factors that determine either bank profitability or risk. 
Studies on bank profitability (see, for example, Maudos and Guevara, 2004 and 
Valverde and Fernández, 2007) or bank credit risk (see, for example, Salas and Saurina, 
2002), examine the role of macroeconomic factors (such as GDP growth and level of 
indebtedness) or microeconomic factors (such as market competition conditions, interest 
rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, default risk and operating costs), but ignore or 
inadequately portray the specific risks associated with the banks’ real estate loan portfolio 
(see Salas and Saurina, 2002)7. 
One of the exceptions in the literature is the study by Davis and Zhu (2009) which 
analyses the effect of commercial property price changes on the risk and profitability of a 
group of banks from industrialised economies. The authors state that performance of 
banks and bank loans are strongly correlated with asset price changes, and particularly with 
real estate asset prices, owing to banks’ large direct and indirect exposure to the real estate 
sector.  
The present study differs from the study undertaken by Davis and Zhu (2009) on 
three key points. Firstly, it differs with regard to the category of real estate assets analysed. 
We analyse the importance of the exposure to residential mortgage loans and changes in 
real estate prices on bank risk and return, instead of commercial real estate assets. Secondly, 
the sample of banks analysed relates to the EU-15 markets whilst Davis and Zhu (2009) 
analyse a sample of 904 banks from several industrialised counties (including 8 EU-15 
countries). Thirdly, we propose a model of bank profitability vis a vis bank exposure to 
residential mortgage loans that takes into account the level of bank credit risk. 
We use dynamic panel data methods to estimate the influence of residential 
mortgage loans on bank profitability and risk, using a sample of 555 banks in the EU-15, 
over the period from 1995 to 2008. The results suggest that a higher exposure to residential 
mortgage loans on the balance sheet means lower credit risk for banks in good times. The 
results obtained show further a reduction in both credit risk and profitability for banks, 
during the upturn in the price cycle pertaining to the residential property sector. 
Furthermore, we observe a non-linear relationship (U-shaped marginal effect), function of 
bank’s risk, between profitability and the balance-sheet exposure to residential mortgage 
                                                 
7 Salas and Saurina (2002) state that “within the loan category there are different levels of risk, with the riskiest loans being 
those to the real estate and construction sectors, followed by commercial and industrial loans and, finally, household mortgage”. 
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loans. For those banks that have high credit risk, higher exposure to residential mortgage 
loans results in higher risk-adjusted profitability, since residential mortgage loans allow to 
lower credit risk. For banks with a moderate/low credit risk, the effects of higher exposure 
to residential mortgage loans on profitability are also positive or marginally positive.  
In the next section, we briefly characterise the European residential mortgage 
markets and provide a brief review of the factors determining bank profitability and credit 
risk, with a special emphasis on those pertaining to the real estate market. In section 3 we 
present the research questions and the specification of the empirical models proposed. 
Section 4 sets out the results of the empirical analysis. Conclusions are presented in Section 
5.  
 
2. Determinants of Bank Profitability and Credit Risk  
2.1. The European Residential Mortgage Markets  
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) state that there are significant differences between the EU 
countries with regard to the characteristics of the mortgage market8. These institutional 
differences might explain the differences in the volatility of prices and influence differential 
banks’ risk-taking across countries. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
                                  ______________________________ 
In Europe, retail deposits are the main source of funding for residential mortgage 
loans, representing 2/3 of the residential mortgage loans. Mortgage bond issues are the 
second most important funding resource, after deposits. Data obtained from the European 
Mortgage Federation (EMF) show that in 2009, three countries accounted for an 88% slice 
of the entire European mortgage bond market. In Germany “Hypotheken Pfandbriefe” 
represented 44% of all the mortgage bonds issued in the EU, followed by Denmark (29%) 
and Sweden (15%)9. 
                                                 
8 Those aspects relate to several aspects such as the prevailing interest rate in the mortgage market; the 
possibility of Equity withdrawal; the level of LTV (Loan-to-Value) ratios; the accepted property evaluation 
methods and the possibility of asset securitization. 
9 Acharya et al. (2011) identify the existence of three major funding models for mortgage credit in developed 
economies. “The first one is the deposit-based system, where banks originate mortgages funded by deposits and hold the 
mortgages on their books. This “old model of banking” is still the dominant type of mortgage finance in most countries outside the 
US. The second type is the “new model of banking” where loans are no longer held on banks’ balance sheets, but are originated 
7 
 
Coles and Hardt (2000) point out a series of institutional factors which explain the 
unimportance of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) in Europe unlike the situation in the 
USA10. These factors include the existence of other types of competitive funding resources 
on the balance sheet, which is the case with Mortgage-Backed Bonds. With the mortgage 
bond, the originating institution keeps the assets on its balance sheet and assumes ultimate 
responsibility for the bonds’ credit risk, whilst with the MBS, the mortgage credit is sold 
and completely removed from the originating bank’s balance sheet11 (Hardt, 2000). 
Therefore, it is difficult to measure the total exposure to residential mortgage loans for 
those banks which extensively perform securitisation operations, as a result of the fact that 
these operations are not accounted for on the balance sheet. Nevertheless, as this form of 
funding is not commonly used in Europe, the effects on banks’ financial standing should 
be negligible. 
 
2.2. Bank Risk and Profitability and Real Estate Prices 
The review of the literature presented below looks into the relationship between property 
prices and bank risk and profitability. While some studies examine how property prices 
impact banks’ decisions, through a macroeconomic perspective, others evaluate the role of 
real estate exposures in bank’s profitability and risk. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
to distribute in the form of MBS. They document that the US had the largest securitization share (higher than 50% of all 
originations), while no other country exceeded 25%. Only Australia and Canada have sizable MBS markets. The third major 
form of mortgage finance is the “mortgage or covered bond”, popular in continental Europe, especially in Denmark, Germany and 
France. Covered bonds are issued by banks and share many features with MBS, but they also differ in important ways. Most 
importantly, investors in covered bonds have a general claim on the issuing bank; but in the event that the issuing bank defaults, 
the investor can claim the underlying mortgage collateral. This structure provides two layers of protection for the covered bond 
investor: the bank’s equity and the housing collateral.” 
10 Amongst the reasons that Coles and Hardt (2000) identified for the lower amount of securitisation in 
Europe appear the higher capital requirements; the existence of other competitive funding instruments on the 
balance sheet (as it is the case with Mortgage-Backed Bonds); the lack of permission for state guarantees; the 
lack of consistent statistics (hinders evaluation of securitised products); and legal complexity and lack of 
standardisation. 
11 As Hardt (2000) states on page 17 “In the case of mortgage bonds, the originating institution keeps the assets on its 
balance sheet and maintains ultimate responsibility for the credit risk of the bond. The mortgage loans and the bonds remain on 
the on the balance sheet of the originating mortgage credit institution. The use of MBS, by contrast, involves the sale of mortgage 
loans and their complete removal from balance sheet. The institution retains any excess interest from the loans over the all-in cost 
of the securitisation in the form of servicing commissions or other types of income, but removes the loans and any associated capital 
requirement or risk provision from the balance sheet”. 
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2.2.1. The Impact of Residential Property Prices on the Banking Sector: the Macroeconomic Perspective 
Several studies point out that there is a strong financial and economic relationship between 
real estate price cycles and credit cycles: decreased economic activity leads to a feedback 
cycle of falling asset prices, deteriorating balance sheets, tightening financing conditions 
and limiting external finance to fund profitable investment opportunities, and so forth.  
The most influential argument refers to the “financial accelerator” mechanism proposed by 
Bernanke et al. (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In their models, credit market 
imperfections exist because borrowers have informational advantages over lenders 
regarding the true value of the underlying projects. To mitigate the potential problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, banks require clients to provide collateral assets. The 
price of bank loans (the risk premium) will depend upon the value and quality (in terms of 
liquidity, price volatility, etc.) of the collateral. The financial accelerator mechanism 
together with the fact that real estate assets are often used as collateral, explains why real 
estate price cycles tend to have a significant impact on the bank lending behaviour and on 
bank risk and profitability.  
Furthermore, there are potentially other channels through which real estate price 
cycles could affect bank lending behaviour and bank risk and profitability. On one hand, an 
increase in the price of real estate tends to increase the value of banks’ fixed assets (if the 
bank owns property) and boost the bank capitalisation. On the other hand, the real estate 
sector may further affect the banking sector indirectly, via, for example, its overall 
economic impact. When property prices increase above their fundamental values, 
constructors and developers will start new construction. This new construction activity 
generates new demand for other sectors and thus tends to cause an expansion in the 
general economy and may stimulate the demand for bank credit. 
Although the theory and empirical evidence predicts that the increase in property 
prices increases bank loans, the impact of real estate sector prices on bank risk and 
profitability is less obvious (Herring and Wachter, 1999). In an efficient market, the bank 
loan interest rates should reflect the true default risk for the underlying assets, and bank 
profitability should depend only on whether they are more or less risk-averse. Nevertheless, 
the profitability of the bank sector might not increase throughout a property price growth 
cycle if the mortgage credit risk premium component stays low from the start of the cycle. 
This may result if banks change attitudes towards risk throughout the property price cycle 
or when there are distortions in the loan decision process (e.g. Jimenez et al. 2006 and 
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Dell’Ariccia et al. 2008). Herring and Wachter (1999) state that during the property price 
growth cycle, banks may underestimate the default risk on mortgages loans. Banks tend to 
disregard the danger of adverse selection when they expand lending within a short space of 
time. This tendency towards “disaster myopia” can arise as a result of poor risk 
management or changing tolerance for risk12. In particular, it can be attributable inter alia to 
inadequate data, measurement bias (Borio et al., 2001), pervasive incentives linked to the 
safety net, intensified competition following the liberalisation of the banking sector (e.g., 
Chan et al. 1986, Hellman et al. 2000 and Marquez 2002) or institutional memory loss over 
time regarding the possibility of property prices collapsing (Berger and Udell, 2004). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) state that decision-makers tend to formulate 
subjective probabilities on the basis of the “availability heuristic”, i.e., based on how easily 
decision-makers can imagine that the event will occur. Since the ease with which an event 
can be imagined is highly correlated with the frequency that the event occurs, this rule of 
thumb provides a reasonably accurate estimate of high-frequency events. But the ease of 
recall is also affected by other factors such as the time elapsed since the last occurrence. 
Simon (1978) states that this tendency to underestimate shock probabilities is exacerbated 
by the “threshold heuristic”. When the subjective probability falls below some threshold 
amount (π* in figure 2) it is disregard and treated as if it were zero. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
                                  ______________________________ 
Put together, these two factors tend to cause “disaster myopia”, in other words, the 
tendency, over time, to underestimate the probability of low-frequency shocks. Bank 
managers have a tendency to consider the existence of a positive probability of a collapse 
of property prices, albeit a limited one, since they are a priori unaware of such probability 
and do not have sufficient information to extrapolate it. During the upturn in the property 
price cycle, this subjective probability of a price collapse tends to decrease, leading banks to 
expand loans to a larger number of borrowers. Furthermore, borrowers deemed to be very 
risky during the previous stage of the cycle, tend to obtain loans more easily during the 
                                                 
12
 Other authors also argue that participants in housing markets display myopic and extrapolative 
expectations. Stevenson (2008) argues “that while it is generally accepted that investors in capital markets operate under 
rational expectations, this is no so in illiquid markets such as housing. A common view is that housing market participants 
generally display a form of extrapolative or adaptive expectations. Malpezzi and Wachter (2005) report that myopic expectations 
also play a role in that participants may fail to anticipate or account for potential reversals in price trends. Given the reliance on 
recent history, the role played by adaptive expectations can be linked to myopic behavior (Case and Shiller 1989)”. 
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expansion phase. Consequently, the quality of the loans portfolios is likely to deteriorate 
and the portfolio of loans become much riskier during the maturity phase of the cycle13. 
Once a shock occurs, disaster myopia tends to become disaster magnification. The 
availability heuristic may exacerbate financial conditions because, just after a shock (such as 
t+n’ in figure 2), it is easy for all agents to imagine another sharp decline in real estate prices 
and the subjective shock probability will rise well above the true shock probability. As 
Guttentag and Herring (1984) show, this will result in sharply increases in interest rates as 
banks try to reduce exposure and increase risk premiums in response to sharply higher 
shock probabilities. The extent of credit rationing is likely to expand for borrowers who 
cannot offer a credible contractual rate that will compensate for the increase in the 
perceived risk of default. Regulators and supervisors also tend to suffer from disaster 
magnification, and in response to the greatly increased subjective probability of a disaster 
they may seek to protect the banking system by insisting on higher capital ratios and more 
aggressive provisioning against potential losses. 
This phenomenon is further worsened by the fact that many banks delay 
provisioning for loan losses to the recession phases of the property price cycle, thereby 
leading the economic cycle to have a greater impact on bank capital and profitability 
(Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). 
In sum, the disaster myopia phenomenon might induce banks to take excessive 
risks while the risk premium required may not be enough to compensate for potential 
losses.  
Another related question has to do with the diversification versus focus debate (please 
refer to Diamond 1984, Winton 1999, Stomper 2006). Financial intermediation theory 
suggests that banks should diversify to reduce risks or focus their lending on industries 
about which they have superior expertise to increase risk-adjusted returns. Acharya et al. 
(2006) and Elyasiani and Deng (2004) provide empirical evidence that loan portfolio policy 
should not be driven by diversification but by a bank’s specific monitoring abilities in 
industries or sectors. Yet Guttentag and Herring (1985, 1986) state that the decision to 
concentrate credit in a given sector  depends mostly, amongst other factors, on the increase 
in expected returns, on the decreased probability of default and on the expected value of 
the assets. 
                                                 
13
Hellman et al. (2000) express the view that Japanese financial-market liberalization in the 1990 increased 
competition and reduced the profitability and franchise value of domestic banks, which, jointly with others 
factors, lead to the East Asian financial crisis and a weaker financial system in Japan. 
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2.2.2. Other Determinants of Bank Risk and Profitability 
Our goal here is to identify the risk and profitability determinants used in the previous 
studies to ensure that the results obtained for the variables associated with the real estate 
sector are not biased by omitted factors. 
 
2.2.2.1. Credit Risk 
Macroeconomic Factors 
The empirical evidence suggests that there is a close relationship between bank’s credit risk 
and the economic cycle. When economic growth is low or even negative, companies and 
households reduce their cash inflows (sales, wages), which in turn leads to increased default 
on payments to banks. In this paper we use the GDP growth rate to proxy economic 
activity, because GDP is considered to be a more informative measurement than other 
macroeconomic variables, such as changes in unemployment, real wages and real interest 
rates (Salas and Saurina, 2002).  
Depending on the level of indebtedness of companies and households, changes in 
aggregated economic activity may have different effects on credit risk. Moreover, such 
effects may vary from country to country, due to differences in debt composition of 
households and companies (short versus long-term debt), and differences in the 
relationship between banks and companies. Davis (1992) finds that in countries such as the 
US, the UK, Canada and France, a rise in the companies’ indebtedness increases its 
bankruptcy probability. In Japan, the effect is the opposite. Germany appears to be an 
intermediate case (non-significant relationship). In the Japanese financial system, there is a 
close relationship between banks and companies which means that banks are highly 
informed about companies’ financial situation. Therefore, banks tend to be less reluctant to 
finance companies during periods of economic recession, even if the companies’ debt ratio 
may be already high14.  
Microeconomic Factors 
Salas and Saurina (2002) refer the rate of credit growth, the composition of the loan 
portfolio and the incentives to take riskier credit policies as the three main microeconomic 
variables which could explain the banks’ risk decision-making.  
                                                 
14 Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that the existence of a close relationship between the bank and the 
company increases the availability of funds for the latter.  
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A rapid credit growth is considered to be one of the main causes of increased bank 
risk. Clair (1992) and Solttila and Vihriälä (1994), after controlling the composition of 
banks’ loans portfolio, show evidence that past loan growth explains the current level of 
bad debt. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) empirically demonstrate that banks with rapid credit 
expansion are riskier. Salas and Saurina (2002) state that banks that focus on increasing 
market share tend to register lower levels of quality required of their customers. Therefore, 
if another bank tries to steal its market share, the bank will probably try to keep its best 
customers and will let go its lowest-quality customers. Consequently, if the credit expansion 
is made in a new geographical area or sector in which the bank has no earlier experience, it 
is more likely to be affected by problems of adverse selection.  
Credit monitoring is also another key element to ensure a good credit policy. To 
this end, an effective risk analysis and internal control structure needs to be in place. The 
shortage and misuse of resources allocated to this task may affect the bank’s solvency. 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) find that decreases in costs efficiency are related to increases 
in bad debt. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) further state that inefficient banks are more prone 
to risk taking.     
Another factor which may affect credit risk is the portfolio composition. Different 
types of loans have different credit risks. The structure of the balance sheet, particularly the 
loan portfolio, reflects the credit risk accepted by managers. Pensala and Solttila (1993), 
Randall (1993), Murto (1994), Domowitz and Sartain (1999), amongst others, state that the 
different credit categories have different levels of risk, and the real estate and construction 
sectors come out on top as the most risky sectors, followed by commercial and industrial 
loans, and finally, household mortgages. 
 Keeton and Morris (1988) consider whether the high level of bad debt of some 
banks is the result of a deliberately riskier credit policy, though anticipated by charging 
higher interest rates (a higher risk premium). The authors conclude that banks which 
charge the highest interest rates are those which previously had high levels of bad debt.  
The existence of incentives by managers to follow policies of taking high risks may 
be another factor determining bank credit risk. Banks with solvency problems can try to 
solve them by betting on a rapid credit expansion in sectors with high profitability but also 
with high risk. Contributing towards this situation is the fact that shareholders and 
managers have little to lose, given their limited liability and due to the fact that these banks 
have a low level of capital. A subtler case appears when bank margins decrease 
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continuously. Managers can attempt to compensate this slow but steady decrease by 
adopting riskier credit policies that could eventually cause increases bad loans. 
 Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that a higher percentage of young companies are 
financed in a concentrated banking market rather than in a competitive one. According to 
the authors, if the bank has monopoly power, the possibility of charging the company 
higher interest rates in the future means that a bank can finance a higher number of lower 
quality customers, or that these customers could receive funds from the bank even in 
periods of financial distress. This situation will tend not to happen in competitive markets, 
where it is not possible to recover in the future the losses of the present because the 
company, after solving its difficulties, would not pay an interest rate above the market rate. 
 
2.2.2.2. Profitability 
Macroeconomic Factors 
Valverde and Fernández (2007) use real GDP when analysing the factors determining the 
interest margins of European banks15. The authors posit that the relationship between 
banks’ gross margin and economic growth depends upon the correlation between prices, 
costs and the economic cycle. Economic growth tends to be negatively related to bank 
prices and costs, however, the extent to which these variables are affected is varied. Carbó 
et al. (2003) state that the net effect of economic growth on bank margins is not clearly 
determined.  
In their analysis of the factors determining the gross margin in European terms, 
Valverde and Fernández (2007) include a dummy which indicates whether the bank 
operates under a bank-based systems (in which bank balance-sheet activities are 
comparatively high in relation to bank credit activities) or a market-based systems (in which 
capital markets activities are comparatively high in relation to bank credit activities). The 
aim of this variable is to show the potential effects on margins in accordance with the 
structure of the financial system. The authors use a composite indicator - a weighted 
average of bank and capital market activities relative to GDP, developed by Levine (2002) -  
to classify the countries in each of the different financial systems.   
                                                 
15 Maudos and Guevara (2004), Valverde and Fernández (2007) and Lepetit et al. (2008b), amongst others, use 
the Net Interest Margin (NIM) variable as a proxy for bank profitability. The variable measures the difference, 
in terms of yield, between the active interest and passive interest from banking operations undertaken by 
banks, given the asset total. It is similar to the gross margin of non-financial companies. 
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Microeconomic Factors 
A large part of the literature on the banking sector focuses on the determinants of interest 
margins. In their pioneering study, Ho and Saunders (1981) adopt the concept of banks as 
mere intermediaries between depositors and customers, and state that the interest margins 
have two basic components: the degree of competition of the markets and the interest rate 
risk to which the bank is exposed. This model has been extended by several studies: Allen 
(1988) widens it to permit the existence of different types of credits and deposits. McShane 
and Sharpe (1985) change the source of the interest rate risk, situating it in the uncertainty 
of the money market instead of the interest rates on credits and deposits. Angbanzo (1997) 
extends the model to take into account credit risk as well as interest rate risk.  
According to the theoretical model developed by Maudos and Guevara (2004), the 
factors determining the “pure” interest margins are as follows: the competitive structure of 
the markets, average operating costs16, risk aversion, the volatility of money market interest 
rates and the credit risk. Maudos and Guevara (2004) also state that, in practice, there may 
be other variables which explain the interest margins, capturing the influence of 
institutional, regulatory, quality of management aspects, which could potentially distort the 
“pure” interest margin and which are difficult to incorporate into theoretical models. 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) also argue that regulation on the form of interest rate 
restrictions on deposits or minimum reserves and solvency ratios might have a significant 
impact on banks’ interest margins. 
Acharya et al. (2006) find that a U-shape relationship between bank returns and the 
degree of concentration, as a function the level of bank risk. Their results suggest that there 
are some diseconomies of diversification in banks which expand their business activities 
into highly competitive sectors or sectors in which they have no prior experience. The 
results reveal that these diseconomies show up in the deterioration of their loan portfolio 
and simultaneously in banks’ decreased profitability (possibly driven by deterioration in the 
effectiveness of banking monitoring, adverse selection, increased general expenditure, or a 
combination of these factors). 
 
                                                 
16 Maudos and Guevara (2004) state that “the extension of the model realized in this paper yield the inclusion of an 
additional term, the average operating costs, in the explanatory equation of the interest margin. Consequently, firms that incur 
high unit costs will logically need to work with higher margins to enable them to cover their higher operating costs. Observe that, 
even in the absence of market power and of any kind of risk, a positive margin will be necessary in order to cover operating costs.” 
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3. Sample and Methodology 
3.1. Research Questions 
We address the following questions: 
I. What is the expected impact of the relative expansion of residential mortgage loans on 
bank credit risk? Does the impact vary over the property price cycle and is it influenced by 
the institutional characteristics of the country where the bank operates? 
The marginal effect of increase in residential mortgage loans on bank credit risk can 
be written as: 
        
           
                                                                        
where RISK is the proxy for credit risk; RMShare is the weight of residential mortgage loans 
in the bank’s total assets and RPPRICE is the residential housing real prices growth rate. 
The results will shed light on whether residential mortgage loans have a positive or 
negative impact on bank credit risk and whether the effect on bank credit risk increases or 
decreases with the rise in residential property market prices (given by parameter 12). 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), Acharya et. al. (2011) and Martins et al. (2012) state that 
there are significant differences across countries in terms of the characteristics of the 
mortgage credit markets. They show that markets with higher growth rates and less 
conservative lending practises (with for example, high leverage ratios and possibility of 
extracting capital) also tend to have higher owner occupancy rates. By influencing the level 
of risk-taking by banks, the institutional differences pertaining to the mortgage market may 
help to explain some differences of the impact of residential mortgage loans on bank credit 
risk. It is expected that banks in countries whose credit policy characteristics are less 
conservative have a greater propensity to take risks. 
 
II. What is the expected impact of the relative expansion of residential mortgage loans on 
bank profitability? Does the impact vary over the residential property price cycle? 
The marginal effect of increase in residential mortgage loans on bank profitability 
can be written as: 
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where MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability; RMShare is the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in the bank’s total assets and RPPRICE is the residential housing real prices 
growth rate or the accumulated growth rate of residential housing real prices.  
The results will allow evaluating if the residential mortgage loans have a positive or 
negative impact on bank profitability and if the effect on bank profitability increases or 
decreases with the rise in residential property prices (given by parameter 13). 
Herring and Wachter (1999) state that during the property price growth cycle, 
banks may underestimate the default risk on mortgages loans. This may result if bank 
change attitudes towards risk throughout the property price cycle or when there are 
distortions in loan decision process. Chan et al. (1986) show that increased competition 
erodes the surplus that banks can earn by identifying high-quality borrowers. The reduction 
in value leads banks to reduce their screening of potential borrowers and, thus overall 
portfolio credit quality declines. In a context of asymmetric information, Marquez (2002) 
refers that an increase in the number of the banks in a market disperses the borrower-
specific information and will result in higher funding costs for low-quality borrowers but 
also in a higher access to credit for low-quality borrowers. The customers to whom banks 
lend later in the cycle may not only be of lower credit quality but in addition, they may have 
borrowed more in terms of LTV and due to both buying more and at a higher price are 
more vulnerable to negative equity. Thus it is likely that the impact of residential mortgage 
loans on bank profitability vary over the residential property price cycle. 
 
As mentioned above, while traditional banking theory, based on the delegated 
monitoring argument, recommends that the optimal bank loan policy is one that is as 
diversified as much as possible into various different sectors of business activity or 
projects, Elyasiani and Deng (2004) and Acharya et al. (2006), in turn, suggest the possible 
existence of diseconomies of diversification for a bank that expands to other sectors of 
business activity or assets. They state that the relationship between profitability and the 
degree of concentration of banking activity could be a nonlinear function of bank risk. 
From traditional portfolio theory, we know that diversification increases the central 
tendency of the distribution of loan portfolio returns. However, when debt is risky and the 
level of debt is above the central tendency of the distribution, diversification can in fact 
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increase the probability of bank insolvency (Winton, 1999). This would occur, for example, 
if the downside risk of bank loans is substantial.  
Another additional impact reinforcing the non-linear relationship between bank 
returns and the weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets is the conflict of 
interests between bank owners and bank creditors. More specifically, an increase in the 
probability of insolvency reduces the incentives of bank owners to monitor their loans. If 
the loan portfolio has high downside risk (i.e., a high probability of asset returns falling 
below deposits, making the bank insolvent), then an improvement in loan monitoring and, 
in turn, in loan quality produces greater benefits to the creditors than to the bank owners. 
Since the cost of monitoring is borne by the bank owners (the residual claimants), an 
increase in diversification weakens the incentives for bank owners to monitor loans. This, 
in turn, leads to lower bank returns.  
Given the above arguments, the relationship between residential mortgage loans 
and profitability could be non-linear, U-shaped, function of the level of risk. This is the last 
question we address: 
III. Is the relationship between bank profitability and residential mortgage loans a non-
linear function? Is the relationship between bank profitability and residential mortgage 
loans a function of the level of risk?  
The marginal effect of the increase residential mortgage loans (RMShare) on bank 
profitability could be described as: 
          
           
                        
                                              
where MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability; RMSHARE is the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in the bank’s total assets and RISK is the proxy for bank credit risk. 
If the marginal effect of the concentration on residential mortgage loans on bank 
profitability is a U-shaped function of the level of risk, then 13 < 0 and 14 > 0.     
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3.2. Variables and Model Specifications 
 
3.2.1. Bank Credit Risk Model 
In order to study the effects of residential mortgage loans on bank credit risk, we 
estimate following model: 
                     
 
   
                      
                      
 
   
                  
              
 
   
               
 
   
            
                                         
                                                                                                                    
 
where RISK is the proxy for bank i credit risk measured by the ratio between loan loss 
provisions to net loans in period t17; RMSHAREi is the weight of residential mortgage 
loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential 
housing prices (in the country or in the region, for those banks whose exposure to the real 
estate market is at a regional level). Table 1 presents the residential housing price series. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 1 
_____________________________ 
We use the following control variables. GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the 
ratio between the liabilities of families and GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities 
of companies and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETSi is the ratio between the bank’s total credit 
and total assets; INEFi is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZEi is the ratio 
between the bank’s assets and banking industry aggregate assets; MARGINi is the proxy for 
bank profitability measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITYi is the ratio 
between equity capital and total assets; PREMi is the difference between interest income 
over total assets and the interbank interest rate; The ηi captures the unobservable effects of 
the intrinsic characteristics of bank i (such as managers’ risk-aversion and preferences). εit is 
                                                 
17 Angbazo (1997), Salas and Saurina (2002), Maudos and Guevara (2004), Acharya et al. (2006) and Lepetit et 
al. (2008a, 2008b), amongst others, also use this ratio as a measurement of bank credit risk.  
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the error term The detailed definition of the variables and the expected relationships are 
shown in table 218. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 2 
___________________________ 
 
3.2.2. Profitability Model  
We estimate the following linear regression:  
                         
 
   
                   
 
   
        
           
 
   
             
 
   
                
                          
 
   
           
                                        
                                                                                                                   
As above, we use the Net Interest Margin as a proxy for bank profitability 
(MARGIN)19. RMSHAREi and RPPRICE are defined as above. 
We use the following control variables. BBMBi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the bank operates in a bank-based system and the value 0 if bank operates in a market-
based system. RISKi is defined as above lagged two and three periods. LIQi is the ratio of 
Liquid Assets to Short Term Funding. SDR3M is a proxy for interest rate risk and is given 
by lagged annual standard deviation of daily interbank 3 month interest rates. HHI is the 
Herfindahl and Hirschman Index. ΔLOANi is the rate of growth of credit loans. IPPi are 
Implicit Interest Payments given by the ratio of Non-Interest Expenses – Non-Interest Revenues 
to Total Assets. The other variables are defined as above. The detailed definition of these 
variables and the expected relationships are shown in table 3. 
 
                                                 
18 For a more depth explanation of risk management importance and determinants of credit risk, please refer 
to Freixas and Rochet (2008).  
19  Angbazo (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and Guevara (2004), Valverde and Fernández 
(2007) and Lepetit et al. (2008b) amongst others, also use this proxy. 
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_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 3 
_____________________________ 
 
In order to assess if the relationship between bank profitability and residential 
mortgage loans credit is a U-shaped function of the level of risk we estimate the following 
regression: 
                         
 
   
                   
 
   
        
           
 
   
             
 
   
                
                          
 
   
                      
                                            
    
                                                                                                                              
 
We also analyze the impact of mortgage credit markets characteristics on bank 
credit risk and profitability. For this purpose, the variable LTV (the average loan to value 
ratio in the country where the bank operates) is added in equations (4) to (6). 
 
3.3. Dynamic Panel Data Models  
Salas and Saurina (2002) and Valverde and Fernández (2007) suggest to use first-
differences of the equations above in the estimation of the dynamic panel data models, in 
order to eliminate bank-specific effects (see Arellano and Bond, 1988 and 1991).  
In the appendix, we present the dynamic panel data model with detail. The 
unobservable individual effects (ηi) in equations (4) to (6) tend to be correlated with other 
explanatory variables. For example, in the credit risk model, ηi tends to be correlated with 
the managers’ (unobservable) risk preferences and with the lagged loan provision ratio. If 
equations (4), (5) and (6) are expressed in first differences from the variables, the individual 
effects will be eliminated. Yet, by using static panel data estimation, estimates would be 
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biased given that the transformed lagged dependent variable will still be correlated with the 
transformed error terms. Furthermore, the explanatory variable weight RMShare is 
endogenous, and should therefore be defined with adequate instrumental variables. In 
particular, three variables are treated as endogenous in the estimation. These are the proxies 
for credit risk (RISK), profitability (MARGIN) and the weight of residential mortgage loans 
in bank’s total assets (RMShare).  
To overcome the aforementioned biases, we use the linear GMM estimation 
procedure. The instrumental variables for the endogenous variables are the same variables 
lagged throughout a number of periods (h) sufficient to prevent the second-order 
autocorrelation of residuals (Salas and Saurina, 2002). In equation (4) the dependent 
variable is transformed, since the ratio of loans provisions to loans is a truncated variable 
(between zero and one) and is therefore not suitable for the GMM procedure. 
 
3.4. Sample 
The sample is composed of annual unbalanced panel data, obtained from the annual 
reports and accounts of 555 banks within the EU-15 countries for the period from 1995 to 
2008. The use of lagged variables reduces the time period of the estimations: bank credit 
risk regressions and profitability regressions are estimated, respectively, between 1999 to 
2008 and 2002 to 2008. The following table presents the distribution of banks analyzed by 
country and by specialisation.  
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 4 
______________________________ 
The sample was obtained via BANKSCOPE. Banks with less than three 
consecutive years of observations or missing information in terms of the explanatory 
variables were eliminated. With regard to some banks, there is no information available in 
BANKSCOPE regarding the amount of residential mortgage loans. In these situations, the 
information was collected from banks’ annual reports and accounts20. 
                                                 
20 IAS14 (substituted by IFRS 8 on 1st January 2008) “Operating Segments” require companies to disclose the 
main operating segments. Given the importance of residential mortgage loans in the activity of the banks 
analysed, it is possible – by looking at the annual report and accounts – to calculate the amount of residential 
mortgage loans.  
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We chose residential mortgage loans rather than full mortgage loans due to the 
absence and poor quality of prices data in the other segments of the real estate market, and 
the lack of detailed segmentation of the non-residential mortgage loans. 
 The data related to concentration index, interbank market interest rates; residential 
housing prices and families’ and companies’ indebtedness ratios and GDP were obtained 
from the European Central Bank, DATASTREAM, BIS House Prices and EUROSTAT, 
respectively. 
Tables 5 and 6 present the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the 
estimation of the credit risk and profitability models. 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLES 5 and 6 
                                 _____________________________ 
An analysis per country shows us that Spain, United Kingdom, and Ireland are the 
countries with the highest weights of residential mortgage loans on bank total assets. The 
high house price growth rates and the fact that banks in these countries have less 
conservative credit policies (Martins et al. 2012) might explain these figures. These markets 
with higher growth rates and less conservative lending practises also tend to have higher 
owner occupancy rates. It is therefore not surprising that three countries are the countries 
with the highest residential mortgage loans weight on bank total assets. They are also 
among the countries with highest average house price growth rates. In contrast, in 
Germany and in Austria, that have rather conservative lending practices (Martins et al. 
2012) and experienced average house price growth rates close to zero in recent years, 
residential mortgage loans weight on bank total assets is much lower.  
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4. Results 
4.1. Credit Risk Model  
Table 7 (panel A) shows the results for the estimates of the credit risk model regression (4). 
The panel B shows the estimated coefficients for subsamples of banks.  
________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 7  
                                    ________________________________ 
  Results suggest that banks that increase residential mortgage loans decrease credit 
risk. The results are in line with Pensala and Solttila (1993), Randall (1993), Murto (1994), 
Domowitz and Sartain (1999). The results also show that during the upturn in residential 
market prices cycle, a rise in residential mortgage loans leads to a decrease in bank credit 
risk.  
Martins et al. (2011) state that due to the accentuated process of bank 
internationalisation and integration at regional and international level, the real estate assets 
tend to be related with regional or international residential prices, and they therefore 
suggest the use of a regional or international indices of residential housing prices as a proxy 
for the real estate risk factor. Regression VI in table 7 assesses the effects of altering the 
proxy associated with the residential property prices, for banks whose exposure to the real 
estate market is at a regional or international scale21. The results reveal that an increase in 
the weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets leads to a greater decrease in credit 
risk.  
Despite the possibility of a “disaster myopia” phenomenon, whereby the quality of 
bank assets may deteriorate without the banks being aware that they are accepting a higher 
risk level, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) state that there tends to be a policy of delaying the 
recognition of loan losses provisions until the phase when property prices collapse. This 
being the case, the relationship between the residential mortgage loans and credit risk tends 
to be only recognized in bank balance sheets a posteriori, during the property price collapse 
cycle. Therefore, the results found must be taken with caution. 
                                                 
21 Martins et al. (2011) consider that a bank is exposed to the real estate market at a regional level when its 
assets portfolio associated with the real estate sector on the international market represents 40% or more. In 
order to measure the geographical exposure to the real estate sector, they analyze the banks’ annual reports 
and accounts, namely the primary and secondary segment reporting, which banks are obliged to disclose in 
accordance with IAS 14 and IFRS 8. 
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Most of the control variables coefficients show the expected sign, although some 
are not statistically significant. The GDP growth rate (current and lagged one-year) has a 
negative effect on credit risk, as predicted by the theory. For the other two macroeconomic 
variables, families and companies’ indebtedness, the coefficient is, respectively positive and 
significant, as expected, and negative but statistical insignificant sign. The weight of credit 
in bank assets and banks’ relative size also affect the level of loans provision, as expected. 
The results show further that larger banks seem to account for a lower relative weight of 
loan provisions in their balance sheets. 
The variables associated with the inefficiency level and solvency ratio are not 
statistically significant in the estimated models. This may result because of multicolinearity 
problems. With regard to the solvency ratio, Davis and Zhu (2009) state that its effect on 
credit risk is unclear. The authors state that when the solvency ratio is high the incentives 
for taking risks are lower, and a negative sign is thus to be expected for the coefficient 
associated with that variable. However, too-low capital ratios may induce banks to “gamble 
for resurrection”, which may have the opposite impacts on banks’ lending decisions.  
Banks’ interest margins are statistically significant. As for the proxy for the risk 
premium, it is statistically insignificant in the regressions for all the banks (panel A), and 
statistically significant in 3 of the 4 regressions for banks subsamples (panel B). Salas and 
Saurina (2002) state that it might be possible not to find a positive impact if strong 
competition introduces cross-subsidization of products inside banks.  
The aim of regressions IV and V shown in tables 7 (panel A) is to analyse the 
impact of institutional factors on bank credit risk. We use “Loan-to-Value” (LTV) ratio, 
obtained from the ECB, which correspond to the average loan to value ratio in the country 
where the bank operates. The LTV ratios are used owing to the absence of information set 
out individually by bank regarding LTV ratios. Regressions IV and V show that countries 
with higher LTV ratios observe higher level of loan losses provisions.  
We repeat the regressions based on subsamples of banks (panel B). Regressions VII 
and VIII refer, respectively, to the clusters of Germany and Austria, and Spain, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom. Results suggest that the impact of increasing residential mortgage 
loans on total assets leads to a greater credit risk reduction in the cluster formed by 
Germany and Austria. Regressions IX and X analyze the effects of increasing residential 
mortgage loans on bank credit risk in the 1st and 4th quartiles of banks, divided on the basis 
of the weight of residential mortgage loans on total credit. The results reveal that an 
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increase in residential mortgage loans results in a decrease in credit risk, which is greater in 
those banks with less residential mortgage loans.   
The empirical models were estimated by making some alterations in order to assess 
the robustness of the results. First, to avoid some of the multicolinearity problems, we 
remove from the model all the lagged variables with no statistical significant coefficients. 
Our conclusions remain unchanged. Second, all the results (signs and significance of 
parameters) hold if the risk premium does not appear in regressions or if another proxy is 
used. Results are available upon request. 
Finally, the hypotheses of the absence of a time series second order correlation (the 
regressions were estimated to the first difference) and of the validity of the instruments 
used (Sargan test) are not rejected.  
 
4.2. Profitability Model 
 Table 8 presents the results of the linear regressions between bank profitability and 
the weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets, specified by equation (5). The five 
regressions reveal that those banks increasing their weight of residential mortgage loans in 
total assets saw their profitability rise during the period analyzed: the coefficient associated 
with the variable RMSHARE is positive and statistically significant. By looking at 
regression II, we conclude that bank profitability tends to decrease during the upturn in the 
residential property price cycle. This fact can be explained by the “disaster myopia” 
phenomenon. As explained above, during the upwards property price cycle, banks tend to 
expand credit to riskier customers and collateral requirements tend to decrease (see 
Jimenez et al. 2006 and Dell’Ariccia et al. 2008). Accordingly, both the credit portfolio 
quality and the profitability are damaged by increasing competition (e.g. Chan et al. 1986, 
Hellman et al. 2000 and Marquez 2002). These conclusions are also corroborated by 
regressions IV and V, where the residential property prices variable is replaced by the 
cumulative real growth of residential property prices in the country (or region, in the case 
of regression V) where a bank operates.  
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_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 8 
                                  ______________________________ 
Table 8 (panel B) tests the hypothesis of non-linear, relationship between 
profitability and the weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets, function of the 
level of credit risk, in accordance with equation (6). The results support the hypothesis that 
there is a U-shaped non-linear relationship between profitability and weight of residential 
mortgage loans in total assets, function of the level of risk. The coefficients of the 
interaction variables, RMSHAREit* RISKit-1 and RMSHAREit* (RISKit-1)
2, are negative and 
positive, respectively, and statistically significant. The results of the statistic F to test the 
statistical significance of the linear and quadratic terms, separately and together, reveal that 
the coefficients of these variables are statistically significant, contributing towards 
increasing the explanatory power of the regression.   
By analysing the coefficients of the control variables, it can be seen that the lagged 
MARGIN variable reveals a statistically significant positive sign. In majority of regressions, 
credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk and the concentration index are also statistically 
significant with a positive effect on banks’ profitability. This is consistent with previous 
findings (see, for example, Angbazo, 1997). The results show further that inefficient banks 
tend to have lower profitability margins in line with other studies, such as Maudos and 
Guevara (2004).  The positive statistically significant sign associated with the solvency ratio, 
in majority of regressions, could suggest that banks require a premium in their margins, due 
to the pressures of ensuring solvency by regulators. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of the ΔLOAN variable (loan growth rate) suggests that banks that register high 
loan growth may be required to work with lower banking margins (as suggested by 
Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Valverde and Fernandéz (2007) find an identical result. The IPP 
variable (implicit interest payments) has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant, 
for the majority of regressions. This variable reflects extra payments to depositors through 
service charge remission or other types of transfers due to competition in the market for 
deposits. These extra payments tend to cause an increase in the banks gross margins 
consistent with the findings of Angbazo (1997). The GDP growth rate also shows a 
positive and statistically significant effect on banks’ gross margins. Finally, the dummy 
associated with the structure of financial systems, reveals that bank-based system tend to 
present larger gross margins than market-based financial systems countries. 
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The coefficient associated with the country’s average LTV ratio (proxy for the 
institutional characteristics of the mortgage market), is positive and statistical significant, 
suggesting that banks in countries where credit practices are less conservative (high 
leverage ratios) tend to require a higher profitability margins. Equations VIII and IX are 
estimated for banks’ 1st quartile and 4th quartile, in line with the weight of residential 
mortgage loans to total loans, respectively.  
Finally, the non-rejection of the null hypotheses of the Sargan test and the second-
order autocorrelation test allow us to conclude drawn from the estimated models appear 
supported.   
 
4.3. Effects of Residential Mortgage Loans on Banks’ Risk-Adjusted Profitability  
The effects of residential mortgage loans should be studied both in terms of the 
profitability and credit risk. If the increased weight of residential mortgage loans on total 
assets produces an increase in profitability and a decrease in credit risk, then the final effect 
is an improvement in bank’s risk-adjusted profitability. When bank profitability and credit 
risk either increase or decrease, the overall effect on the bank’s risk-adjusted profitability is 
ambiguous and cannot be ascertained without taking a stance on what constitutes an 
“efficient” risk-profitability trade-off.   
The effects of residential mortgage loans on total assets on bank profitability and 
risk during property booms are summarised in the table below, based on the empirical 
evidence of tables 7 and 8: 
_____________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 9 
                                  ______________________________ 
From table 9, we can draw the following two conclusions for the sample of banks 
and period analyzed: 
1) Increasing weight of residential mortgage loans on total assets results in an 
efficient trade-off between risk and profitability. More specifically, bank 
profitability tends not to be affected or tend to be slightly reduced by increasing 
weight of residential mortgage loans on total assets for low to moderate 
insolvency risk banks, and to increase with weight of residential mortgage loans 
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on total assets for high insolvency risk banks. Since credit risk tends to decrease 
with an increasing weight of residential mortgage loans on total assets, banks 
with high insolvency risk improve risk-adjusted profitability. 
2) The effect of an increasing weight of residential mortgage loans on total assets 
on banks with moderate insolvency risks cannot be correctly ascertained 
without reference to how much the bank’s profitability should increase via a 
unitary increase in bank risk22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 In practice, many banks use a risk-adjusted return on capital framework to determine whether such loans 
are beneficial. Commonly the return per unit of risk of the loan should exceed some cost of capital 
benchmark specified by the bank such as the after-tax ROE of the bank. 
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5. Conclusion 
The paper evaluates the effects of increasing the weight of residential mortgage 
loans on bank risk and profitability for a sample of 555 banks within the EU-15, for the 
period from 1995 to 2008. The results indicate that residential mortgage loans have a 
significant impact on bank profitability and risk.  
The results suggest that increasing the weight of residential mortgage loans tends to 
result into a decrease in bank credit risk. This is explained by the fact that this asset is used 
as collateral to obtain other loans and is perceived by banks as contributing towards 
reducing credit risk. The results obtained show that the decrease in credit risk as result of 
an increase in the weight of residential mortgage loans is higher during the upturn in the 
residential property price cycle and in countries with more conservative loans practices. 
This result explains why banks rush to lend on property during booms due to the positive 
effects it has on credit risk. The results also show that bank profitability tends to decrease 
during the upturn in the residential property price cycle.  
The results also reveal the existence of a non-linear relationship (U-shaped marginal 
effect), function of the level of bank’s risk, between profitability and the weight of 
residential mortgage loans on total assets. For those banks with high credit risk, an 
increasing weight of residential mortgage loans on total assets tends to raise the bank’s risk-
adjusted profitability. For banks with a moderate credit risk, the effects of increasing weight 
of residential mortgage loans on banks’ risk-adjusted profitability are also positive or 
marginally positive.  
The results highlight the need to develop indicators of the bank’s individual 
exposure to the real estate market, which could help to calibrate the potential impact of 
changes in the weight and price of residential housing assets on bank risk and profitability.  
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Appendix 
The Dynamic Panel Data Model  
This appendix presents the Dynamic Panel Data Model used in this study. We use the first-
difference of the equations to estimate in order to eliminate the bank-specific effects (see 
Arellano and Bond, 1988 and 1991). Yet, this procedure introduces a new error term which 
is correlated to the lagged dependent variable introduced among the set of explanatory 
variables. Arellano and Bond (1991) address this correlation and possible endogeneity 
problems by proposing the use of lagged variables of the explanatory variables in levels as 
instruments variables and the two-step GMM estimator. In the first step, the error terms 
are assumed to be both independent and homoskedastic, across banks and over time. In 
the second step, residuals obtained in the first step are used to construct a consistent 
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix, thus relaxing the assumptions of independence 
and homoskedasticity. Griliches and Hausman (1986) reveal that the “difference estimator” has 
been found to exacerbate measurement error biases. An alternative method is used in this 
paper to estimate the regression in differences jointly with the regression level, as proposed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995). As show by Blundell and Bond (1998), this system estimator 
reduces the potential biases in finite samples and asymptotic imprecision associated with 
the difference estimator. The estimator uses the lagged differences of the explanatory 
variables as instruments. They are valid instruments under the assumption that the 
correlation between the bank-specific effect and the levels of the explanatory variables is 
constant over the time. The consistency of the GMM estimator depends both on the 
validity of the assumption of absence of serial correlation of the error term and on the 
validity of the instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest two tests to validate these 
assumptions. The first is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the 
overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample analogue of the moment 
conditions used in the estimation procedure. The Sargan test is based on the observation 
that the residuals should be uncorrelated with the set of exogenous variables when the 
instruments are truly exogenous. This statistic will be asymptotically chi-squared under the 
null hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments. The second test, 
examines the assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms. We test if the 
differenced error term is first-order serially correlated. Under the null hypothesis of no 
second-order serial correlation, this test has a standard-normal distribution. 
31 
 
The general model, which closely follows the Arellano and Bond (1988) model, is a 
single equation with individual effects. The equation takes the form: 
                                                         
 
   (A-1) 
where, ηi  and     are respectively, the individual and temporal effects, xit is the vector of the 
explanatory variables, B(L) is the vector of associated polynomials in the lag operator, and q 
is the maximum lag length in the model (      indicates  transpose). The number of time 
periods available on the ith individual is Ti. The νit are assumed to be independently 
distributed across individuals with a zero mean, but arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity 
across units and time are possible. The xit may or may not be correlated with the individual 
ηi effects and for each of these cases the effects may be strictly exogenous, predetermined, 
or endogenous variables with respect to νit. 
 The (Ti – q) equations for the individual i can be written conveniently as follows: 
                                   ,                                                                               (A-2) 
where σ is a parameter vector including the αk’s, the β’s and the λ’s, and Wi is a data matrix 
containing the time series of the lagged dependent variables and the x’s. Finally, ti is a 
vector (Ti – q)*1 of ones. The dynamic panel data can be used to estimate various linear 
GMM estimators of σ with the general form: 
                        
           
     
      
            
   
                         (A-3) 
where           
 
 
   
       
                                                                            (A-4) 
and   
  and   
  refer to transformations of Wi and yi (example, levels, first differences, 
orthogonal deviations, deviations from individual means). Zi is the matrix of instrumental 
variables. Hi is a possible individual specific weighting matrix.   
 When estimating dynamic models, transformations that allow the use of lagged (and 
pre-determined) endogenous variables as instruments in transformed equations should be 
used. Where there are no instruments available that are uncorrelated with the individual 
effects   , the transformation should eliminate this component of the error term. The first 
difference transformation is one example of a transformation that eliminates    from the 
transformed error term without entering all the lagged values of the perturbation term     
in the transformed error term. Hence, this transformation allows the use of suitably lagged 
(and pre-determined) endogenous variables as instruments.    
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Table 1: Residential Housing Prices Series 
The table presents the sources of residential house price series with its description, source, prices type, dwelling type, geographical coverage and first observation. All these series were 
deflated using CPI. All series were obtained from Bank International Settlements (BIS): BIS House Prices. 
Country Dwelling Dwelling Type Geographical Coverage Prices Description of Index Period Source 
Germany 
Second Hand 
Dwellings. 
Property offering a good quality 
of life in average to good 
locations. 
Terraced houses and flats. 
Western Germany: Before 1989: 50 
towns/cities. 
From 1990 onwards: 100 towns/cities. 
From 1995 onwards: 125 towns/cities 
(100 towns/cities in Western Germany 
and 25 towns/cities in Eastern 
Germany) 
Typical values quantified 
by real estate experts who 
refer to price data of 
various types, including 
non-transaction prices. 
Prices weighted through population. 
Aggregation based on the share of terraced 
houses and flats in the total living área. 
1975 - 
Central Bank of Germany. 
Figures are based on data 
from BulwienGesa AG. 
(www.bundesbank.de) 
Austria 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Houses and apartments. Vienna Transaction Prices. Weighted average price 1976  - 
Central Bank of Austria 
(www.oenb.at) 
Belgium 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Small and medium sized 
dwellings for sale by mutual 
agreement. 
Nationwide Transaction Prices. 
Average price index weighted by the number of 
transactions for each type of housing. 
1988 - 
STADIM (private 
consultancy) 
(www.stadim.be) 
Denmark 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Houses, flats and holiday homes. 
Nationwide (data collected at 
municipal level). 
Transaction Prices. 
Average price per square meter for 
municipalities weighted with the dwelling 
stock. 
1971 - 
Danish Mortgage 
Association 
(www.realkreditraadet.dk) 
Spain 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
All dwellings excluding those 
that have a market value over  
€1.050.000. 
Nationwide (data collected for 
provinces and municipalities with more 
than 25.000 inhabitants. 
Price is calculated by using 
official valuations: “Open 
market appraised housing” 
Average price per square meter weighted with 
the number of valuations.  
1987 - 
Ministry of Housing 
(www.fomento.gob.es) 
Finland 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Houses and apartments. 
Large Cities (with more than 100.000 
inhabitants). 
Transaction Prices. 
Average price index weighted by the number of 
transactions for each type of housing. 
1978 - 
Central Bank of Finland 
(www.suomenpankki.fi) 
France 
Second Hand 
Dwellings. 
Second-hand dwellings: more 
than 5 years old or sold a second 
time within the 1st  
5 years. 
Paris. 
 
Nationwide. 
Transaction Prices. 
Paris: Average price per square meter observed 
in sales. 
 
Country: Hedonic regression. 
1980 - 
 
1994 - 
Notaires – INSEE 
(www.insee.fr) 
Greece 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
N/A Athens and 17 major cities.  Transaction Prices. 
Prices weighted with the dwelling stock (in 
square meters) in Athens and 17 major cities. 
1994 - 
Central Bank of Greece 
(www.bankofgreece.gr) 
Netherlands 
Second Hand 
Dwellings. 
Detached house, corner house, 
terraced house, apartment, semi-
detached house. 
Nationwide. Transaction Prices. Weighted repeat sales. 1976 - 
National Land Register 
(Kadaster) 
(www.kadaster.org) 
Ireland 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
All newly mortgaged residential 
property. 
Nationwide. 
Price at mortgage 
approval. 
Weighted average of house price for new and 
second hand dwellings in the period in question. 
1971 - 
Department of the 
Environment 
(www.environ.ie) 
Italy 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
N/A 13 large urban areas. Transaction Prices. Weighted average price 1988 - 
NOMISMA 
(www.nomisma.it) 
Luxemburg 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Flats and Houses. Nationwide. Transaction Prices. Laspeyere price indices. 1974 - 
Central Bank of 
Luxembourg  (www.bcl.lu) 
Portugal 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Flats and Houses. Nationwide (exclude islands) 
Price is calculated by using 
official valuations. 
Weighted price indices by hedonic regression 
and by housing type. 
1988 - 
Imométrica 
(www1.ipd.com) 
UK 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
Detached house, semi-detached 
house, bungalow, terraced house 
and flats. 
Nationwide. Transaction Prices. Mixed Adjusted 1969 - 
Department of Communities 
and Local Government 
(www.communities.gov.uk) 
Sweden 
New and Second 
Hand Dwellings. 
One and two dwelling buildings. Nacional N/A 
Weighted average of the price indices of owner-
occupied adjusted for ratable values and based 
on the legal registration. 
1986 - 
Statistics Sweden 
(www.scb.se/) 
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Table 2: Determinants of Bank Credit Risk: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
RISKit-1 Ratio of loan loss provision to net loans from the previous period (RISK). The current ratio is closely related to that of the previous 
period, since loan loss provisions are not immediately written down in the bank balance sheet.  
Positive 
GDPt-h Real GDP Growth Rate. Measures the impact of aggregated economic activity. The larger the economic growth the lower the degree of 
default by economic agents.  
Negative 
DFAMt 
Ratio Between the Liabilities of Families and the GDP. This ratio measures the families’ indebtedness level.  
Positive 
DEMPt 
Ratio Between the Liabilities of Company and GDP. This ratio measures the company’s indebtedness level.  
Positive 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-h 
Ratio between Total Credit and Total Assets lagged one, two and three periods. A target of rapid increase in market share can force the 
bank to reduce the quality of its borrowers. However, since the loan is granted till it becomes a provision loans, there is a lag unknown 
and variable. In order to measure the temporal effects, we allow three lags, starting at t-1. If it were lagged less are than one period, it 
could be spuriously correlated with the dependent variable through the denominator.  
Positive 
INEFit Level of Bank Inefficiencies provided by the ratio “Operating Costs to Gross Income”. A higher value for the ratio indicates that there are 
management inefficiencies. It is expected that banks with better management in place have a lower level of loan provisions. 
Positive 
SIZEit 
Bank’s Relative Dimension provided by the ratio between bank assets i and total bank assets, during the period t. As we noted in section 
2.2.2.1, some authors use this variable to measure risk diversification policies. A big balance sheet allows the managers to invest in 
different geographical or business segments to deal with asymmetric shocks. If the relative size is a good proxy for risk diversification, we 
should find a negative coefficient. On the other hand, this variable may capture the bank’s market power. In this situation, we should 
expected a positive sign for the coefficient, because when the bank increases the market power, increase the probability of granting credit 
to companies with a higher credit risk. 
Positive or 
Negative 
MARGINit-h 
Bank Interest Margin obtained by the variable “Net Interest Margin”, lagged two and three periods. This variable is a measure of the 
difference between the interest income generated by banks and the amount of interest paid to their lenders (for example, deposits), 
relative to the amount of their (interest-earning) assets. It is similar to the gross margin of non-financial companies. The present variable 
not only reflects the profitability of bank credit, but also incorporates a risk premium. The increased risk will tend to provoke an increase 
in the gross margin, for which reason the variables are lagged.  
Positive 
EQUITYit-h 
Solvency Ratio is provided by the ratio between Capital and Total Assets, lagged two and three periods. The impact of solvency 
difficulties is not straightforward. The loans provisions will appear later because it takes time to change credit policy. The higher the 
solvency ratio, the lower the incentives to take more risks. Therefore, a negative coefficient is expected for the coefficient. Nevertheless, 
lower capital ratios may induce banks to “gamble for resurrection”, thereby causing the opposite impacts on bank decisions.  
Positive or 
Negative 
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Table 2: Determinants of Bank Credit Risk: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships (cont.) 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
PREMit-3 
Credit Risk Premium. The higher ex post credit risk may be anticipated by the bank charging an ex ante risk premium in the interest of the 
loans. To control for this effect, we include PREMit-3 (the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest 
rate) as a proxy for the risk premium. The tree-year lags is designed to catch the ex ante component of risk premium. If the riskier loans are 
properly priced, the coefficient associated to the variable should be positive and statistically significant. However, it is possible that a 
positive impact may not be found if strong competition induces cross-subsidization of products inside banks.  
Positive 
RMShareit 
The weight of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s assets. 
? 
RPPRICEt-1 The rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing prices in the country (or in the region, for those banks whose exposure to the real 
estate market is at a regional level). Detailed information about residential housing price series appears in table 1. 
? 
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Table 3: Determinants of Bank Profitability: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
MARGINIt-1 
Bank Interest Margin from the previous period.  
Positive 
GDPt-h 
Real GDP growth rate. The relationship between the bank margins and growth will depend on the correlation between prices, costs and 
the business cycle. Economic growth is negatively related to bank prices and costs, although the extent to which these variables are 
affected may be significantly different, meaning that the net effect on margin may not be clearly determined (Carbó et al., 2003).  
Positive or 
Negative 
BBMBt 
Bank-Based or Market-Based System. A dummy variable is used in order to show the potential effects of the differences in the bank 
margins according to the structure of the financial system. The dummy take the value 1 if the bank operates in a bank-based system and 
the value 0 if bank operates in a market-based system. Valverde and Fernández (2007) found positive and negative signs, statistically 
significant, for this proxy. 
Positive or 
Negative 
RISKit-h 
Credit Risk defined by the value of the ratio “Loan Loss Provisions to Net Loans” lagged into two and three periods. The values of this ratio 
are lagged since risk parameters are not expected to affect margins contemporaneously. A greater risk premium should be required by the 
bank when the credit risk increases. 
Positive 
LIQit-h Liquidity risk provided by the ratio “Liquid Assets to Short Term Funding”. The risk of insufficient liquidity may force banks to request 
emergency funds at excessive cost. Angbazo (1997) states that the liquidity risk tends to affect bank margin positively. 
Positive 
SDR3M it-h 
Volatility of the Market Interest Rate is used as the proxy for the interest rate risk. The uncertainty in the money market is reflected in the 
theoretical model by the variance of the market interest rate. The empirical proxy for this variable is consequently based on a 
measurement of volatility of the market interest rate, such as the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank interest rate at 3 
months. The variable is lagged since the volatility of the market interest rate is not expected to affect the gross margin 
contemporaneously. It is expected that the interest rate risk increases banks’ gross margin (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000).  
Positive 
HHIt 
Herfindahl and Hirschman Index computed from banks total assets on the domestic market. In theory, the level of concentration of 
banking activity and banks’ gross margins tend to be positively related. However, this relationship may be influenced by third variables 
and the gross margins can be negatively affected by market concentration (see for example, Cetorelli and Gambera, 2002). The HHI 
variable was obtained from two reports from the European Central Bank (ECB, 2005 and 2010). 
Positive or 
Negative 
INEFit 
Level of Bank Inefficiencies provided by the “Cost to Income Ratio”. The existence of high operating costs implies increased operating 
inefficiency. Therefore, we expect those banks experiencing higher costs to increase prices to a greater extent (if they enjoy market 
power), so that inefficiency will result in higher margins (Altunbas et al., 2001). Maudos and Guevara (2004) state that this proxy may, 
alternatively, indicate the quality or efficiency of the management. There tends to be higher quality management when there is a lucrative 
composition of assets and a low cost composition of liabilities. Thus a higher ratio would imply lesser management efficiency or quality, 
which would reflect lower gross margins. 
Positive or 
Negative 
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Table 3: Determinants of Bank Profitability: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships (cont.) 
Variable Variable Definition 
Coefficient 
Sign 
ΔLOANit 
Average Dimension of Operations or Credit Volume. In the estimation we use the loans growth rate as proxy. In the model developed by 
Maudos and Guevara (2004), the gross margins are a growing function of the average dimension of the operations realized. The reason 
for this is that for a certain risk value and market risk, a large operation will tend to involve greater risk of potential loss, so the bank will 
tend to require a greater margin. Thus, the potential loss will tend to be greater for banks with a high volume of credit volume. Davis and 
Zhu (2009) refers that if the bank’s risk attitude remains the same across the credit cycle, its profitability should be higher as a 
compensation for the higher credit risk. Nevertheless, if the risk-taking behaviour is associated with distorted incentives, such as the 
“disaster myopia” tendency mentioned before, its linkage with bank profitability is more ambiguous. 
Positive or 
Negative 
EQUITYit-h 
Solvency Ratio provided by “Capital to Assets Ratio”. Valverde and Fernández (2007) state that debt substitution for capital, lower the 
bank’s insolvency risk and possibly decrease the funding costs for the bank. But as the capital is becoming a more costly source of 
funding, an increase in equity tends to increase the average cost of the capital. Thus, a higher gross margin will tend to be required ex-ante. 
Davis and Zhu (2009) state that the solvency ratio may have two opposite effects on bank profitability. If the cost-of-funding effect 
dominates, a higher equity ratio leads to higher bank profitability. If the “gamble for resurrection” effect dominates instead, banks with lower 
capitalisation will invest more on high-risk assets and the loan quality is impaired. 
Positive or 
Negative 
IPPit 
Implicit Interest Payments. Following Ho and Saunders (1981), Angbazo (1997) and Saunders and Schumacher (2000), the proxy “(Non-
Interest Expenses – Non-Interest Revenues)/Total Assets” is used to measure the implicit interest payments. This variable reflects extra 
payments to depositors through service charge remission or other types of transfers due to competition in the market for deposits. These 
extra interest expenses should be mirrored in higher interest margins. 
Positive 
RPPRICEit-1 
Rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing prices in the country (or in the region, for those banks whose exposure to the real 
estate market is at a regional level) or the accumulated rate of growth in real terms of residential housing prices. Detailed information 
about residential housing price series appears in table 1. 
? 
RMShareit The weight of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s assets. ? 
 Table 4: Distribution of Banks by Country and Specialization 
This table shows the banks distribution by country and specialization. The sample was obtained from the database 
BANKSCOPE. We only consider banks with more than three consecutive years of observations between 1995 and 
2008. The banks’ specialization is in agreement with the classification used by database BANKSCOPE. The 
specialization category “Others” includes: “Bank Holdings & Holding Companies”, “Savings Banks” and 
“Investment Banks”. 
Country 
Number of Banks 
Commercial Cooperative 
Real Estate & 
Mortgage 
Others Total 
Germany 28 6 3 10 47 
Austria 16 9 5 10 40 
Belgium 8 1 0 5 14 
Denmark 40 0 2 12 54 
Spain1 22 5 0 43 70 
Finland 5 0 0 1 6 
France 37 50 3 5 95 
Greece  13 0 0 1 14 
Netherlands 18 1 1 6 26 
Ireland 11 0 3 1 15 
Italy 27 16 0 17 60 
Luxemburg 11 1 0 2 14 
Portugal  7 1 1 9 18 
United Kingdom 24 0 34 8 66 
Sweden 5 0 4 7 16 
Total 272 90 56 137 555 
1 
The column relating to “Others” has only Saving Banks given the importance of the Cajas de Ahorros in 
Spain. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the 555 European Banks in the period between 1999 and 2008. 
RISK is the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM 
is the ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms 
and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating 
costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the 
proxy for bank profitability measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between 
the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets 
and the interbank interest rate; LIQ is the ratio net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual 
standard deviation of the daily interbank 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index 
obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 
and 10.000); IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; ΔLOAN is the 
loans growth rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; 
RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing market prices. 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  
Minimum Maximum  
RISK (%) 0,662 2,834 -2,297 35,353 
GDP (%) 2,001 1,469 -3,000 6,500 
DFAM (%) 72,871 27,989 24,240 148,280 
DEMP (%) 201,861 49,795 90,230 379,400 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS  59,055 22,824 0,523 99,130 
INEF (%) 62,783 30,818 0,000 254,050 
SIZE (%) 2,281 6,472 0,000 58,183 
MARGIN (%) 2,613 10,533 -2,870 13,230 
EQUITY (%) 8,317 6,745 -0,465 99,591 
PREM (%) 1,890 13,444 -5,269 12,992 
LIQ (%) 84,894 5,400 0,000 320,084 
SDR3M 0,411 0,527 0,888 0,023 
HH 685,148 489,445 158,00 3160,00 
IPP (%) 1,187 15,862 -6,972 2,820 
ΔLOAN (%) 14,612 13,044 -37,672 54,000 
RMSHARE (%) 30,943 21,234 0,000 99,443 
RPPRICE (%) 4,841 6,590 -14,742 23,222 
 Table 6: Descriptive Statistics by Countries 
This table shows the descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation by countries, in the period between 1999 and 2008. RISK is the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; 
GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of 
total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the 
interbank interest rate; LIQ is the ratio net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman 
Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total 
assets; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing 
market prices. The table reports the mean and standard deviation for each variable and country. The standard deviation comes in brackets. 
 GER AUT BEL DEN SPA FIN FRA GRE NET IRL ITA LUX POR UK SWE 
RISK (%) 0,441 
(3,30) 
0,853 
(6,04) 
0,210 
(0,62) 
0,657 
(0,99) 
0,494 
(0,28) 
0,093 
(0,21) 
0,467 
(2,00) 
1,317 
(1,90) 
1,760 
(7,14) 
0,244 
(0,57) 
0,686 
(1,06) 
0,123 
(0,038) 
0,750 
(0,90) 
0,384 
(1,40) 
0,549 
(5,26) 
GDP (%) 1,172 
(1,03) 
2,095 
(1,06) 
1,927 
(0,95) 
1,270 
(1,30) 
3,107 
(0,91) 
3,175 
(1,24) 
1,647 
(0,69) 
3,764 
(1,35) 
1,991 
(1,17) 
4,509 
(3,02) 
0,824 
(1,02) 
3,927 
(2,18) 
0,879 
(0,90) 
2,329 
(0,75) 
2,320 
(1,44) 
DFAM (%) 
69,159 
(3,89) 
51,522 
(2,58) 
43,030 
(4,01) 
125,740 
(13,42) 
74,136 
(12,19) 
46,452 
(9,15) 
55,712 
(5,80) 
40,782 
(12,13) 
109,062 
(11,06) 
82,717 
(21,04) 
38,852 
(5,66)) 
55,554 
(5,84) 
93,025 
(9,41) 
97,738 
(10,08) 
68,591 
(6,58) 
DEMP (%) 169,207 
(9,50) 
153,853 
(24,34) 
240,480 
(31,89) 
172,505 
(23,11) 
200,300 
(29,65) 
213,366 
(19,22) 
205,644 
(25,19) 
107,190 
(13,67) 
239,409 
(15,10) 
278,896 
(26,49) 
146,100 
(8,47) 
317,992 
(34,70) 
241,243 
(9,30) 
253,201 
(19,79) 
264,141 
(26,80) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS 0,479 
(0,235) 
0,554 
(0,194) 
0,420 
(0,201) 
0,650 
(0,107) 
0,679 
(0,150) 
0,563 
(0,262) 
0,586 
(0,259) 
0,612 
(0,150) 
0,495 
(0,278) 
0,527 
(0,249) 
0,611 
(0,225) 
0,308 
(0,163) 
0,583 
(0,229) 
0,662 
(0,203) 
0,672 
(0,277) 
INEF (%) 72,971 
(32,29) 
66,592 
(31,87) 
64,568 
(18,93) 
58,308 
(16,53) 
60,184 
(31,06) 
67,547 
(18,66) 
63,525 
(28,63) 
71,475 
(36,21) 
63,553 
(34,44) 
63,505 
(18,39) 
45,31 
(44,18) 
54,415 
(23,10) 
61,305 
(13,80) 
62,985 
(17,88) 
55,020 
(29,26) 
SIZE (%) 0,893 
(2,42) 
2,897 
(5,02) 
11,991 
(17,98) 
1,519 
(5,20) 
1,413 
(4,01) 
16,002 
(27,90) 
1,203 
(3,59) 
5,929 
(6,74) 
2,672 
(6,24) 
2,584 
(3,24) 
0,975 
(3,25) 
4,723 
(4,38) 
4,184 
(5,75) 
0,682 
(1,71) 
7,054 
(10,84) 
MARGIN (%) 6,573 
(35,66) 
1,892 
(1,31) 
1,749 
(1,56) 
3,763 
(1,66) 
2,305 
(0,81) 
2,035 
(1,18) 
1,950 
(1,37) 
2,921 
(1,03) 
1,478 
(0,99) 
1,256 
(0,77) 
2,769 
(1,33) 
0,959 
(0,53) 
2,477 
(1,30) 
1,997 
(1,82) 
1,563 
(1,05) 
EQUITY (%) 6,581 
(8,92) 
7,525 
(9,93) 
5,279 
(2,59) 
11,917 
(4,99) 
7,907 
(3,56) 
7,158 
(2,89) 
8,907 
(4,76) 
8,715 
(6,51) 
6,476 
(3,55) 
5,184 
(2,89) 
9,978 
(6,24) 
5,253 
(2,36) 
8,417 
(8,21) 
7,859 
(9,18) 
8,460 
(8,69) 
PREM (%) 2,350 
(5,29) 
1,798 
(2,17) 
2,132 
(3,61) 
2,021 
(1,52) 
1,175 
(1,11) 
0,245 
(1,34) 
1,810 
(1,66) 
2,303 
(1,47) 
1,765 
(3,39) 
1,006 
(1,61) 
1,823 
(3,36) 
3,930 
(3,82) 
2,216 
(1,97) 
2,413 
(37,99) 
0,951 
(1,35) 
LIQ (%) 70,603 
(5,45) 
100,21 
(8,24) 
59,634 
(2,93) 
133,24 
(2,90) 
92,96 
(3,13) 
80,64 
(3,84) 
132,55 
(4,92) 
72,56 
(2,46) 
135,11 
(2,35) 
84,65 
(4,06) 
120,23 
(9,46) 
41,58 
(2,57) 
85,69 
(3,47) 
93,97 
(7,94) 
179,31 
(2,14) 
SDR3M 0,295 
(0,17) 
0,304 
(0,18) 
0,299 
(0,17) 
0,301 
(0,17) 
1,100 
(1,18) 
0,299 
(0,18) 
0,304 
(0,18) 
0,296 
(0,17) 
0,285 
(0,16) 
0,295 
(0,17) 
0,295 
(0,17) 
0,289 
(0,18) 
0,296 
(0,17) 
0,384 
(0,24) 
0,346 
(0,16) 
HH 174,75 
(9,85) 
545,37 
(42,97) 
1971,00 
(167,74) 
1132,37 
(42,50) 
496,00 
(34,12) 
2547,50 
(316,47) 
648,75 
(60,00) 
1117,75 
(33,24) 
1841,75 
(136,60) 
597,87 
(81,96) 
265,25 
(43,86) 
293,75 
(15,10) 
1073,75 
(64,16) 
370,75 
(52,12) 
845,25 
(67,58) 
IPP (%) 2,423 
(36,1) 
0,912 
(2,3) 
0,423 
(1,1) 
1,422 
(1,2) 
1,323 
(5,2) 
0,523 
(1,2) 
0,323 
(3,2) 
1,623 
(2,2) 
0,523 
(1,2) 
0,223 
(1,6) 
1,723 
(13,1) 
0,156 
(1,4) 
0,934 
(1,6) 
0,534 
(30,4) 
0,223 
(3,2) 
ΔLOAN (%) 7,221 
(57,8) 
11,767 
(20,85) 
9,208 
(31,7) 
16,101 
(15,93) 
31,239 
(29,53) 
15,329 
(51,7) 
12,719 
(65,0) 
38,086 
(23,5) 
36,167 
(54,8) 
23,905 
(69,9) 
25,373 
(63,3) 
12,651 
(25,7) 
22,206 
(46,4) 
6,254 
(22,8) 
23,940 
(62,2) 
RMSHARE (%) 20,032 
(17,0) 
20,902 
(11,1) 
16,932 
(10,8) 
27,923 
(14,2) 
35,623 
(15,2) 
29,734 
(21,2) 
29,821 
(18,3) 
23,523 
(11,2) 
24,232 
(23,2) 
32,321 
(26,2) 
26,823 
(15,2) 
11,012 
(8,3) 
26,121 
(15,2) 
34,523 
(28,2) 
31,623 
(26,9) 
RPPRICE (%) 0,318 
(0,70) 
1,903 
(4,93) 
7,373 
(3,09) 
5,271 
(8,11) 
7,472 
(6,14) 
5,510 
(8,20) 
7,296 
(6,60) 
4,536 
(4,76) 
2,568 
(1,05) 
4,210 
(6,90) 
5,188 
(2,01) 
6,316 
(4,55) 
-2,255 
(2,16) 
4,791 
(10,12) 
5,618 
(4,11) 
Table 7: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis 
 
Panel A: Total Sample 
This table reports the estimation results of six regressions based on equation (4). The dependent variable RISK is the 
ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk. This variable 
appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio 
between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; 
SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is 
obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE 
is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of 
the residential housing market prices (or region, in the case of regression VI, for banks with regional or international 
exposure to the housing market). LTV is the average loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates.  We 
use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM estimation procedure. t statistics are presented in 
brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables I II    III         IV V VI 
RISKit-1 0,3165
a 
(10,63) 
 0,3333a 
    (10,95) 
0,3354a 
(10,57) 
0,2205a 
(7,94) 
0,2258a 
(7,89) 
0,1224b 
(2,02) 
GDPt -0,0495
a 
(-9,77) 
-0,0468a 
     (-9,24) 
-0,0459a 
(-8,84) 
-0,0303a 
(-5,82) 
-0,0297a 
(-5,66) 
-0,0637a 
(-6,88) 
GDPt-1 -0,0327
a 
(-6,97) 
-0,0354a 
     (-7,36) 
-0,0347a 
(-7,21) 
-0,0295a 
(-6,04) 
-0,0292a 
(-5,96) 
-0,0417a 
(-4,84) 
DFAMt 0,0067
a 
(4,93) 
 0,0058a 
    (4,32) 
0,0049a 
(3,67) 
0,0121a 
(5,02) 
0,0121a 
(5,01) 
0,0053b 
(2,24) 
DEMPt -0,0004 
(-1,26) 
-0,0004 
     (-1,20) 
-0,0003 
(-0,86) 
-0,0012a 
(-3,71) 
-0,0011a 
(-3,33) 
-0,0007c 
(-1,75) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0,7091
a 
(4,84) 
 0,7279a 
     (4,93) 
0,7461a 
(4,91) 
0,6380a 
(4,63) 
0,6371a 
(4,44) 
0,1751b 
(2,01) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 -0,0244 
(-0,26) 
-0,0379 
     (-0,40) 
-0,0653 
(-0,67) 
-0,0021 
(-0,02) 
-0,0233 
(-0,24) 
0,0690 
(1,49) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 -0,0643 
(-0,62) 
-0,0701 
     (-0,67) 
-0,1030 
(-0,96) 
0,0143 
(0,12) 
-0,0168 
(-0,14) 
0,1370c 
(1,71) 
INEFit 0,0006 
(1,31) 
  0,0005 
     (1,03) 
0,0005 
(1,02) 
0,0000 
(0,97) 
0,0000 
(0,91) 
0,0007 
(1,37) 
SIZEit -2,4212
a 
(-3,93) 
-2,4531a 
     (-3,88) 
-2,4623a 
(-4,38) 
-2,6112a 
(-3,91) 
-2,6558a 
(-4,25) 
-2,5698a 
(-4,09) 
MARGINit-2 0,0721
c 
(1,89) 
 0,0697c 
     (1,80) 
0,0636c 
(1,77) 
0,1007b 
(2,22) 
0,0966b 
(2,01) 
0,0017b 
(2,18) 
MARGINit-3 0,0698 
(0,71) 
 0,0740 
     (0,74) 
0,1158 
(1,11) 
-0,0468 
(-0,40) 
-0,0425 
(-0,34) 
-0,0043 
(-1,17) 
EQUITYit-2 0,0620 
(0,20) 
 0,0741 
      (0,24) 
0,0125 
(0,04) 
-0,0943 
(-0,33) 
-0,1372 
(-0,46) 
0,2099 
(0,50) 
EQUITYit-3 0,2368 
(0,86) 
 0,1576 
      (0,56) 
0,0303 
(0,10) 
-0,0995 
(-0,31) 
-0,2562 
(-0,76) 
0,3654 
(0,37) 
PREMit-3 -0,2104 
(-0,36) 
-0,2395 
     (-0,41) 
-0,4852 
(-0,79) 
0,2245 
(0,41) 
0,1056 
(0,18) 
0,0278 
(1,33) 
RMSHAREit -1,0151
a 
(-4,73) 
-0,9584a 
    (-4,52) 
 -0,8733a 
(-4,22) 
 -1,2310a 
(-4,80) 
RPPRICEt-1 
  -0,0015c 
(-1,71) 
 -0,0016c 
(-1,80) 
 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0,0072
a 
     (-3,53) 
-0,0098a 
(-4,69) 
-0,0067a 
(-3,40) 
-0,0082a 
(-4,04) 
-0,0069a 
      (-2,82) 
LTVt    0,0876
a 
(8,36) 
0,0842a 
(7,90) 
 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008     1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 4540     4540 4540 4540   4540 4540 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0,235     0,245 0,267 0,289   0,278 0,253 
AR (1) and p-value -3,3a (0,01)  -2,9a (0,00) -2,7a (0,00) -2,8a (0,00)   -2,1b (0,03)  -2,0b (0,04) 
AR (2) and p-value -0,4  (0,75)   0,4 (0,80) -1,3  (0,20) -0,5  (0,67)   -1,1  (0,29)  -0,9  (0,21) 
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Table 7: Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Subsamples 
This table reports the estimation results of four regressions based on equation (4), for subsamples. We use the 
Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable RISK is the ratio of 
provisions for loan losses and the total net loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk. This variable 
appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1-RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio 
between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; 
LOAN_TO_ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; 
SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; MARGIN is the proxy for bank profitability 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is 
obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE 
is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of 
the domestic residential housing market prices. 
Regression VII includes the banks of Germany and Austria. Regression VIII includes de banks of Spain, Ireland and 
UK. Regressions IX and X are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according to the weight of 
residential mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables VII VIII         IX X 
RISKit-1 0,4341
a 
(11,60) 
0,2439a 
(11,75) 
0,1837a 
(4,27) 
0,4509a 
(20,00) 
GDPt -0,0875
a 
(-7,27) 
-0,0778a 
(-9,49) 
-0,0543a 
(-5,10) 
-0,0512a 
(-7,13) 
GDPt-1 -0,0874
a 
(-6,41) 
-0,0152 
(-1,56) 
-0,0340a 
(-3,01) 
-0,0020 
(-0,33) 
DFAMt 0,0492
a 
(8,54) 
0,0049a 
(2,96) 
0,0149a 
(4,37) 
0,0044b 
(2,31) 
DEMPt 0,0113
 
(1,36) 
-0,0015a 
(-2,96) 
-0,0005 
(-0,74) 
-0,0013a 
(-3,10) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-1 0,8430
a 
(4,37) 
0,8647a 
(5,70) 
0,5518c 
(1,89) 
0,3908a 
(2,64) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-2 -0,4459
b 
(-2,21) 
0,2384c 
(1,66) 
-0,2113 
(-1,60) 
0,0321 
(0,16) 
LOAN_TO_ASSETSit-3 -0,1108 
(-0,39) 
0,1291 
(0,69) 
0,1410 
(0,84) 
0,3452b 
(2,14) 
INEFit 0,0013 
(1,15) 
0,0008 
(1,06) 
0,0004 
(0,64) 
0,0028a 
(3,17) 
SIZEit -4,4392
a 
(-3,36) 
-4,271a 
(-2,82) 
-3,2162 
(-1,49) 
-2,6558a 
(-4,25) 
MARGINit-2 0,1037
 
(1,18) 
0,0556 
(0,27) 
0,1401b 
(2,53) 
-0,2973 
(-1,25) 
MARGINit-3 0,2212
c 
(1,69) 
1,7370c 
(1,93) 
-0,1157 
(-0,69) 
-0,2420 
(1,19) 
EQUITYit-2 -0,3141 
(-0,47) 
0,4977 
(0,84) 
0,6365c 
(1,65) 
-0,6511 
(-1,15) 
EQUITYit-3 -0,7999
c 
(-1,66) 
-0,0146 
(-0,02) 
0,0960 
(0,23) 
0,3852 
(1,029) 
PREMit-3 0,0129
c 
(1,67) 
-0,0207a 
(-3,68) 
0,0116 
(1,18) 
0,0254a 
(4,26) 
RMSHAREit -1,5913
a 
(-3,53) 
-0,6654b 
(-2,37) 
-4,1373a 
(-3,44) 
-0,3863b 
(2,44) 
RMSHAREit * RPPRICEt-1 0,0557
a 
(4,44) 
-0,0125a 
(-5,90) 
-0,0385b 
(-2,03) 
-0,0106a 
(-6,50) 
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 
# Observations 688 1273 1011 1081 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0,158 0,132 0,395 0,167 
AR (1) and p-value   -5,5a  (0,00)  -2,3b   (0,01)  -2,9a  (0,00)  -3,1a (0,00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0,3   (0,78)   0,1    (0,90)   0,3   (0,75)  -0,2   (0,81) 
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Table 8: Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis 
 
Panel A: Linear Regressions 
This table reports the estimation results of 5 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (5). We use 
the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable MARGIN is 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability. GDP is the real GDP 
growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the banking 
sector and the value 0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the 
Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is 
the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; 
LIQ is the ratio of net loans  to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 
3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the 
ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio 
non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in 
the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices 
(or region, in the case of regression  III, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). In 
the case of regressions IV and V, RPPRICE is the accumulated growth rate of real market prices of residential housing 
in the country (or region, in the case of regression V, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing 
market). t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables          I         II        III        IV        V 
MARGINit-1 5,805a   (19,65) 5,802a  (19,53) 5,807a  (29,64) 5,809a  (31,16) 5,808a  (31,02) 
GDPt 0,134a    (4,78) 0,142a   (5,00) 0,135a   (4,79) 0,132a   (4,67) 0,132a   (4,66) 
GDPt-1 0,035     (1,24) 0,030    (1,06) 0,037     (1,27) 0,044    (1,50) 0,043    (1,49) 
BBMBt 0,399a    (9,81) 0,389a   (9,63) 0,402a    (9,64) 0,363a   (9,08) 0,363a   (9,06) 
RISKit-2 0,483a   (12,57) 0,482a  (12,40) 0,484a  (12,62) 0,484a  (13,11) 0,484a  (13,07) 
RISKit-3 0,793a   (14,05) 0,792a  (13,84) 0,794a  (14,12) 0,796a  (14,74) 0,795a  (14,69) 
LIQit-1 0,117b     (2,46) 0,123b   (2,46) 0,001b  (2,46) 0,001b  (2,27) 0,001b  (2,29) 
LIQit-2 0,028      (0,58) 0,067    (1,21) 0,000    (0,65) 0,000    (0,82) 0,000    (0,81) 
SDR3M it-1 0,207a        (3,10) 0,197a     (2,96) 0,208a     (3,11) 0,212a     (3,18) 0,213a     (3,18) 
SDR3M it-2 0,360a     (4,34) 0,331a   (3,99) 0,364a   (4,33) 0,323a   (3,94) 0,325a   (3,96) 
HHt -0,042    (-1,05) -0,043  (-1,06) 0,000    (0,16) 0,000    (0,51) 0,000   (0,47) 
INEFit -0,005c   (-1,95) -0,005  (-2,04) -0,005b (-1,96) -0,004c (-1,91) -0,004c (-1,91) 
ΔLOAN it -0,010a   (-7,50) -0,010a (-7,24) -0,011a (-7,47) -0,011a (-7,57) -0,011a (-7,55) 
EQUITYit-2 9,891a     (2,86) 10,011a  (2,88) 9,839a  (2,86) 9,700a  (2,83) 9,700a  (2,83) 
EQUITYit-3 -0,882    (-0,29) -0,823  (-0,27) -0,925  (-0,31) -0,658  (-0,22) -0,639  (-0,22) 
IPPit 4,374c    (1,66) 4,448c    (1,66) 4,360   (1,23) 4,146   (1,23) 4,165  (1,23) 
RMSHAREit 1,904c    (1,83) 2,104b   (2,01) 1,878c  (1,82) 2,053b   (1,99) 2,078b (2,01) 
RMSHAREit*RPPRICEt-1  -0,024a (-3,61) 0,005   (0,49) -0,025a (-5,06) -0,028a (-4,86) 
Time Period  2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 
# Observations       3555 3555 3555 3555 3555 
Sargan Test (p-value)       0,179 0,145 0,130 0,149 0,158 
AR (1) and p-value   -4,5a      (0,00)  -3,8a     (0,01)  -3,3a      (0,00)  -3,6a     (0,00)  -4,0a      (0,00) 
AR (2) and p-value   -0,5       (0,38)   -0,2    (0,82)   -0,5    (0,22)   0,1      (0,78)  -0,3       (0,55) 
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Table 8: Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis: Subsamples (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Quadratic Regressions 
This table reports the estimation results of 4 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (6). We use 
the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano e Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable MARGIN is 
measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability. GDP is the real GDP 
growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the banking 
sector and the value 0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the 
Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is 
the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; 
LIQ is the ratio of net loans  to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 
3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the 
ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross 
income; ΔLOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio 
non-interest expenses – non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in 
the total bank assets; LTV is the average loan to value ratio, by country. Regressions VI and VII include all the banks. 
Regressions VIII and IX are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according to the weight of residential 
mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Variables VI VII        VIII IX 
MARGINit-1 4,575a      (8,75) 5,220a     (13,70) 1,102a      (12,99) 0,811a      (22,46) 
GDPt 0,071a      (2,91) 0,122a     (4,71) 0,078a      (2,59) 0,026a     (4,83) 
GDPt-1 0,034c      (1,66) 0,099a      (3,92) 0,093b      (2,27) -0,004      (-0,47) 
BBMBt 0,296a      (6,44) 0,137b      (2,41) -0,005      (0,11) -0,036a      (-2,93) 
RISKit-2 16,643c    (1,71) 7,727c      (1,86) -0,462      (-0,23) -2,277      (0,33) 
RISKit-3 -9,557a      (-2,66) -3,434      (-0,60) 2,879b      (2,05) 4,871a     (-4,28) 
LIQit-1 0,197b      (2,16) 0,160a       (3,49) 0,095c       (1,69) 0,003      (0,21) 
LIQit-2 -0,001     (-0,07) -0,020      (-0,48) 0,035       (0,25) -0,007      (-1,61) 
SDR3M it-1 0,223a           (3,89) 0,224a              (3,79) -0,034      (-0,24) 0,081a           (5,72) 
SDR3M it-2 0,244a     (3,83) 0,294a       (4,11) -0,093      (-0,45) 0,233a      (9,10) 
HHt 0,172a      (3,33) 0,120b      (-2,54) 0,114b      (2,33) 0,004       (0,33) 
INEFit -0,009a   (-2,94) -0,008a     (-3,21) -0,019a    (-4,46) -0,005a   (-4,57) 
ΔLOAN it -0,051a   (-4,15) -0,042a     (-2,77) -0,007     (-0,50) -0,155b   (-2,57) 
EQUITYit-2 10,634a   (3,11) 8,716a      (2,78) -1,551     (-1,00) -0,431     (-0,66) 
EQUITYit-3 0,894      (0,25) 1,817       (0,51) -4,117b    (-2,03) 0,674c     (1,72) 
IPPit 22,915b    (2,36) 16,089b    (2,39) 88,942a    (4,71) 0,161a    (6,17) 
RMSHAREit 3,266b      (2,27) 4,937a      (3,06) 2,341c      (1,68) 1,074a     (5,49) 
RMSHAREit* RISKit-1 -228,108a    (-2,76) -243,904a    (-3,00) -570,271a    (-4,41) -14,775c   (-1,70) 
RMSHAREit* (RISKit-1)2 2921,803a   (3,57) 2459,394a     (3,23) 1894,734c    (1,72) 1058,387b  (2,37) 
LTVt  0,563a       (7,56)   
Time Period 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 
# Observations 3554 3554 637 644 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0,175 0,157 0,126 0,111 
AR (1) and p-value   -4,8a          (0,00)  -3,6a         (0,01)  -3,9a        (0,00)  -5,2a         (0,00) 
AR (2) and p-value     0,2           (0,88)   -0,6         (0,26)   -0,3        (0,62)   0,3          (0,58) 
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Table 9: Effects of Residential Mortgage Loans on Bank’s Risk Adjusted 
Profitability  
 
 Banks with Moderate Credit Risk  Banks with High Credit Risk 
Effects of the Increase in 
the Weight of Residential 
Mortgage Loans on Asset 
Bank’s 
- Decrease of Credit Risk 
- Profitability Unaffected or Marginal 
Decrease 
 
Increased Performance OR Effect 
on Performance Ambiguous 
- Decrease of Credit Risk 
- Profitability Increase 
  
 
Increased Performance 
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Figure 1: The financing of residential mortgage loans in the EU (2009) 
 
Source: European Mortgage Federation (EMF) (www.hypo.org) 
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Figure 2: Disaster Myopia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Herring and Wachter (1999) 
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